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1HLD-55 (January 2007)                                                     NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS




                       Appellant
vs.
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civ. No. 05-cv-05014)
District Judge: Honorable Freda L. Wolfson
_______________________________________
Submitted For Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
January 19, 2007
Before:  SCIRICA, Chief Judge, WEIS and GARTH, Circuit Judges.





Dale Baranoski appeals the order of the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey denying his Motion for Grand Jury Access and dismissing his
complaint.  
2Baranoski was employed as a police officer with the Westampton Police
Department in Burlington County, New Jersey from 1986 through 2000.  In 2000,
Baranoski was convicted of criminal trespass.  Baranoski alleges that his conviction was
the result of a criminal conspiracy and malicious prosecution undertaken by employees of
the Westampton Police Department and the Burlington County prosecutor’s office.  He
alleges that he contacted defendant, the United States Attorney’s Office for the District of
New Jersey (“U.S. Attorney”), about his claims but that no action was taken.  When
Baranoski attempted to contact the federal grand jury in Camden to investigate his claims,
the U.S. Attorney informed him that he was not allowed to contact the grand jury.  
Baranoski filed a complaint alleging that the U.S. Attorney denied him a
statutory right to present evidence of a federal crime to the federal grand jury in Camden. 
In the alternative, Baranoski sought to “have a Special Grand Jury empaneled to
investigate federal crimes,” and sought to “participate in the presentation of the
allegations as set forth herein by way of Motion” pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3332. 
Baranoski subsequently filed a motion for access to a federal grand jury.  The U.S.
Attorney filed a motion to dismiss, which the District Court granted.  The District Court
held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Baranoski’s claims against the U.S.
Attorney and, further, that Baranoski failed to establish a constitutional, statutory or
common law right to communicate with a federal grand jury.  
3Branoski timely filed a notice of appeal.  We have appellate jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Having granted Baranoski leave to proceed in forma
pauperis on appeal, we must now determine whether his appeal should be dismissed
pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B).  An appeal may be dismissed under § 1915(e)(2)(B) if it has
no arguable basis in law or fact.  Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).   
Baranoski seeks to contact the federal grand jury in Camden to present
evidence of federal crimes for the grand jury to investigate.  We agree with the District
Court that Baranoski does not have a constitutional, statutory or common law right to
independently  communicate with a federal grand jury.  The commencement of a federal
criminal case by submission of evidence to a grand jury is “an executive function within
the exclusive prerogative of the Attorney General.”  In re Persico, 522 F.2d 41, 54-55 (2d
Cir. 1975); see also In re Wood, 833 F.2d 113, 116 (8th Cir. 1987) (an individual cannot
bring accusations before a grand jury unless invited to do so by the prosecutor or the
grand jury).  The U.S. Attorney has exclusive jurisdiction in prosecuting violations of
federal law within the state of New Jersey.  See 28 U.S.C. § 547.  We therefore agree
with the District Court that Baranoski may not access the federal grand jury absent the
participation of the U.S. Attorney or the District Court.  Accordingly, the District Court
properly granted the U.S. Attorney’s motion to dismiss. 
Alternatively, Baranoski seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the United
States Attorney to empanel a grand jury to investigate his claims.  The remedy of
mandamus is reserved for the most extraordinary of circumstances.  DeMasi v. Weiss,
4669 F.2d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1982).  In order to ensure that mandamus is sparingly granted,
a petitioner seeking a writ of mandamus must demonstrate that no other adequate means
are available to obtain the desired relief and that the right to issuance of the writ is “clear
and indisputable.”  Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daifon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 35 (1980).  The
District Court properly denied mandamus relief because Baranoski did not establish he
had a “clear and indisputable” right to compel the U.S. Attorney to empanel a federal
grand jury.  
For the foregoing reasons, Baranoski’s appeal will be dismissed under
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for lack of legal merit. 
